

AUG 19 2010

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION

CHARLES EDWARD WILSON,)	Civil Action No. 7:10-cv-00363
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	<u>MEMORANDUM OPINION</u>
)	
SHERIFF DEPARTMENT,)	By: Hon. James C. Turk
Defendant.)	Senior United States District Judge

Plaintiff Charles Edward Wilson, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with jurisdiction vested in 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Plaintiff names as the sole defendant the Sheriff's Department in Bristol, Virginia. This matter is presently before the court for screening, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. After reviewing plaintiff's submissions, the court dismisses the complaint without prejudice as frivolous.

I.

Plaintiff alleges that a Sheriff's deputy swore out a criminal complaint against him because he allegedly struck the deputy with his shoe while being searched. Plaintiff alleges that he received a six-month sentence for this act and that he never struck the deputy. Plaintiff argues that the deputy lied about the charge and that he is actually innocent. Plaintiff requests as relief an acquittal and \$1.5 million for mental stress and anger. Plaintiff admits that he is presently incarcerated for the convictions for which he is presently suing.

II.

The court must dismiss any action or claim filed by an inmate if the court determines that the action or claim is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The first standard includes claims

based upon “an indisputably meritless legal theory,” “claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist,” or claims where the “factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Although the court liberally construes pro se complaints, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), the court does not act as the inmate’s advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). See also Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that district courts are not expected to assume the role of advocate for the pro se plaintiff).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). However, “civil tort actions are simply not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 374-75 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Permitting civil actions to be used “for that purpose would undercut the long-standing concern not to undermine the finality of criminal convictions through civil suits.” Id. at 375. Therefore, the court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this suit would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the court must dismiss the complaint unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been favorably invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Favorable invalidation occurs when “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to

make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus" Id.

Success on plaintiff's claims clearly would imply the invalidity of his current confinement because he essentially argues actual innocence of the acts of which the deputy complained. If it were not for the deputy's and state judicial officer's acts depriving him of his constitutional rights, plaintiff would not have been convicted of assaulting the deputy. Plaintiff can not prove favorable termination because he is still convicted and serving a sentence for the same convictions for which he seeks monetary relief.¹ Therefore, plaintiff pursues a meritless legal theory to attack his criminal conviction via a civil rights action without establishing any favorable termination.

To the extent plaintiff wants a speedier release from incarceration or to vacate the original conviction, plaintiff must pursue a remedy via a writ of habeas corpus, not a civil rights action. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645-47 (1997) (stating that § 1983 damages claim arguing that due process rights violations resulted in loss of good-time credits should be brought as habeas corpus petition); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-88 (1994) (stating that a § 1983 claim that would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration should be brought as a habeas claim); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (stating that writ of habeas corpus is sole federal remedy when inmate challenges fact or duration of imprisonment and relief sought is finding that the inmate is entitled to a speedier release). Accordingly, the court dismisses the complaint without prejudice as frivolous. See Omar v. Chasanow, 318 F. App'x 188, 189 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (modifying district court's dismissal with prejudice

¹ Plaintiff does not allege that habeas remedies are not available to him.


under Heck to be dismissed without prejudice to allow plaintiff to refile if favorable termination occurs). See also McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (dismissals without prejudice for frivolousness should not be exempted from 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the court dismisses the complaint without prejudice as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1).

The Clerk is directed to send copies of this memorandum opinion and the accompanying order to the plaintiff.

ENTER: This 17th day of August, 2010.


Senior United States District Judge